孟娟娟

孟娟娟，女，汉族，中国出生，现任北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系和金融系副教授。她在美国加州大学获得经济学博士学位。孟娟娟的研究专长包括行为经济学，行为金融学，劳动经济学，发展经济学等。她的研究成果发表在国外顶级学术期刊上，如《美国经济评论》《公共经济学杂志》《国际经济评论》《发展经济学杂志》《游戏与经济理论》《经济行为与组织学杂志》等。^[1]

孟娟娟主持了国家自然科学基金面上项目“参照点和狭隘视野：行为经济学前沿问题探究”和北京青年英才计划"依赖人际关系还是正式渠道——论正式与非正式制度安排对社会经济发展的影响"项目研究。此外，她曾主持国家自然科学基金青年基金研究项目“个体经济行为中的社会性因素”（已结题）。

孟娟娟曾获得光华管理学院最佳新人奖（2007-2008）、美国经济评论杂志的优秀审稿人奖（2001-2004）以及北大明德奖学金等奖项。在北京大学光华管理学院，孟娟娟教授中级微观经济学，高级微观经济学，行为经济学和公共财政等课程。

时间院校专业学位xx-2010加州大学经济学博士xx-2005北京大学金融学学士

2014~至今

北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系副教授

2010~2014

北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系助理教授。

1. 管理经济学

2. 高级微观经济学

研究专长包括行为经济学，行为金融学，劳动经济学，发展经济学等。

Publications:

With Vincent P. Crawford, “New York City Cabdrivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Utility with Targets for Hours and Income”, American Economic Review 101 (August 2011), 1912-1932

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber’s (2005, 2008) empirical analyses and BotondK?szegi and Matthew Rabin’s (2006; henceforth “KR”) theory or reference-dependent preferences. Following KR, our model has targets for hours as well as income, both determined by rational expectations. Estimated with Farber’s data, our model reconciles his finding that stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with Colin Camerer et al.’s (1997) negative wage elasticity of hours; and avoids his criticism that estimates of drivers’ income targets are too unstable to yield a useful model of labor supply.

Working Papers:

“The Disposition Effect and Expectations as Reference Point.” revise and resubmit to Journal of Finance

Abstract: The disposition effect refers to the tendency for investors to sell winning stocks too early and hold losing stocks for too long. This paper shows that investors’ psychological aversion to losses relative to a reference point predicts the disposition effect when the reference point is defined by expected wealth but not the status quo wealth. Estimates from individual trading records suggest that investors’ reference level of gains is higher than risk-free rate, and it is closely tied to their past average realized gains. Infrequent traders are also shown to have higher reference level and stronger disposition effect than frequent traders. Expectations as reference point provide a simple explanation to these regularities. This theory also has the potential to link expectations to the magnitude of the disposition effect hence market movement.

With Wanchuan Lin and Yiming Liu, "Will Formal Risk Sharing Arrangements Crowd Out Informal Mechanisms: An Experimental Study" 2011

Abstract: An important issue with promoting formal insurance in the rural areas of developing countries is the interaction between formal insurance and preexisting informal risk sharing arrangements. Will the introduction of formal insurance crowd out private transfer? What are the welfare consequences? This paper presents the first laboratory study investigating these issues. We show that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal risk sharing arrangements. This effect is strengthened by ex-ante income inequality and weakened by path dependence of the existing informal mechanisms. We further show that the introduction of formal insurance provides better risk coverage when income is equal, but when ex-ante inequality exists, there is no significant risk reduction due to the large crowding-out effect.

"Social Distance, Interpersonal Interaction and Impersonal Exchange", 2010

Abstract: Personal relationships and anonymous market have been previously modeled in ways that prevent them from coexisting in equilibrium as contract enforcement mechanisms. Empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that they sometimes coexist. This paper introduces social utility into preferences, which is determined by social distance and specific to personal relationships but not to impersonal anonymous market exchange. This preference-based approach allows the two modes of exchange to coexist in equilibrium and further characterizes how their market shares depend on the degree of social heterogeneity. The possibility of impersonal exchange improves welfare and equality among buyers in general. But there also exist cases where competition between the two forms of exchange makes welfare and equality deteriorate.

Research in Progress:

"Social Distance and the Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing"

"Social Learning or Social Conformity? The Case of Stock Market Participation Decision"

时间奖项全称颁奖机构2001-2004明德奖学金北大